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Face recognition is generally thought to rely on different neuro-
cognitive mechanisms than most types of objects, but the spec-
ificity of these mechanisms is debated. One account suggests the
mechanisms are specific to upright faces, whereas the expertise
view proposes the mechanisms operate on objects of high within-
class similarity with which an observer has become proficient at
rapid individuation. Much of the evidence cited in support of the
expertise view comes from laboratory-based training experiments
involving computer-generated objects called greebles that are
designed to place face-like demands on recognition mechanisms. A
fundamental prediction of the expertise hypothesis is that recog-
nition deficits with faces will be accompanied by deficits with
objects of expertise. Here we present two cases of acquired
prosopagnosia, Herschel and Florence, who violate this prediction:
Both show normal performance in a standard greeble training
procedure, along with severe deficits on a matched face training
procedure. Herschel and Florence also meet several response time
criteria that advocates of the expertise view suggest signal
successful acquisition of greeble expertise. Furthermore, Herschel’s
results show that greeble learning can occur without normal
functioning of the right fusiform face area, an area proposed
to mediate greeble expertise. The marked dissociation between
face and greeble expertise undermines greeble-based claims
challenging face-specificity and indicates face recognition mecha-
nisms are not necessary for object recognition after laboratory-
based training.
Cognitive neuroscientists generally agree that the visual mech-anisms involved in face recognition are different from those
involved in most other types of object recognition, but the ques-
tion of what these mechanisms are specialized for is a long-
running debate. Are the mechanisms specific to faces, or do
objects sharing certain properties with faces also engage them?
The expertise hypothesis (1, 2) suggests the mechanisms in-
volved in face processing are also engaged by objects with high
within-class similarity for which people have become experts at
rapid individuation. Evidence cited in support of this view comes
from studies with real-world experts and laboratory-trained
experts. Behavioral markers characteristic of face perception
have been claimed to occur for the perception of dogs (1), fin-
gerprints (3), handwriting (4), and chess configurations (5) in
individuals who are long-time experts with these categories (but
see refs. 6–8). Furthermore, brain areas involved in face pro-
cessing were reported to show a stronger response to bird and
car stimuli in participants with expertise for these objects, al-
though it is important to note that areas not selective for faces
also showed an elevated response (9–11; see also ref. 12). Real-
world expertise, however, is difficult to study because experts are
difficult to find, expertise level cannot be experimentally con-
trolled, and the acquisition of face-like expertise with objects has
been suggested to take many years (1, 2). To overcome these
limitations, advocates of the expertise hypothesis developed
an alternative approach in which participants are trained in the
laboratory to become experts with “greebles,” an artificial class
of objects designed to place face-like demands on recognition
mechanisms (2, 13). After 7 to 10 sessions of learning to identify
individual greebles along with the family or sex of the greebles,
most participants become proficient at recognizing greebles and
reach the criterion claimed to indicate expertise (2). The greeble
training procedure is relatively fast and simple, which makes it an
attractive method to investigate the effects of short-term training
on object recognition processes. Furthermore, unlike studies
of real-world object expertise (1, 7), studies with greebles allow
participants to be tested before and after training. Several studies
have reported that greeble training elicited perceptual (2, 14)
and neural (15, 16) effects similar to the effects characteristic
of face processing (but see refs. 17–18 for contrary evidence
with greebles and novel nongreeble objects). Greebles were also
found to interfere with the N170 signal, a reliable marker of face
mechanisms (19, 20), when presented concurrently with faces,
suggesting shared processing (21). Importantly, all these effects
were reported after, but not before, training, implying that face
perception mechanisms may be recruited by other object categories
with which people acquire sufficient expertise.
A fundamental prediction of the expertise hypothesis is that
individuals with compromised face recognition (prosopagnosia)
should also be impaired at acquiring and applying expertise
with other objects such as greebles. Previous studies of greeble
learning in prosopagnosics have been performed, but several
factors complicated their interpretation. Two acquired cases,
SM (22) and LR (23), were unable to develop normal greeble
expertise, in line with the prediction of the expertise hypothesis.
However, their poor performance may be explained by factors
other than a disruption of expertise mechanisms, such as general
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object recognition deficits in the case of SM (24) or difficulty in
learning the individual greeble names in the case of LR (23).
Consistent with this interpretation, both cases were impaired in
greeble recognition from the beginning of training, when neither
patients nor controls are greeble experts. Participants with def-
icits limited to mechanisms necessary for expert processing
would be expected to perform normally in early sessions but
show deficits in later sessions after control participants have
acquired expertise. Edward, a developmental prosopagnosic with
normal object recognition, performed as well as controls in
greeble training (25), but his performance with greebles was not
contrasted with performance on a parallel face training para-
digm, so it is not clear that the greeble training procedure would
have elicited deficits in Edward if faces were used.
Here we test whether two prosopagnosics, Florence and
Herschel, are impaired in a standard greeble training procedure
in a manner that avoids previous limitations. First, their normal
performance in the first sessions with greebles (when everyone is
a greeble novice) ensured the prosopagnosic and control par-
ticipants started on equal footing and provided assurance that
nonexpertise-related factors would not affect the prosopagno-
sics’ performance in later sessions. Second, to ensure the train-
ing procedure elicited impaired performance in Florence and
Herschel when faces were used rather than greebles, we also
created a similar procedure with computer-generated faces that
was matched for difficulty with the greeble training. The training
routine in the current study was very similar to that used in prior
greeble studies (16, 25–27), including the most recent study, in
which a prosopagnosic participant was tested by advocates of the
expertise view (23). It involved eight sessions during which
participants progressively learned to identify greebles at the in-
dividual and family level (or learned to identify faces at the
individual level). Normal greeble learning by Florence and/or
Herschel would be compelling evidence that the acquisition of
expertise in the greeble task (or whatever is needed for successful
performance) does not depend on the same mechanisms used for
face perception, whereas normal performance in early sessions
followed by impaired performance in later sessions would pro-
vide support that greeble experts depend on the same mecha-
nisms for faces and greebles.
Results
Florence and Herschel showed learning profiles comparable to
controls for the greebles, but not for the faces throughout the
training procedures (Fig. 1). To compare performance within
and between participants, we computed an average percentage
correct score for the naming trials and an average percentage
correct score for the verification trials in the criterion phase (last
four sessions) after all individual greebles (or faces) were in-
troduced. Because participants are expected to become experts
during the later sessions, this is also where the expertise hy-
pothesis predicts a dissociation in greeble performance between
controls and prosopagnosics. Each of the criterion phase sessions
had 60 individual naming trials and 60 family verification and 60
individual verification trials. Naming trials included 40 learned
and 20 unlearned stimuli, and participants were informed of
these base rates. For verification trials, the chance level was 50%
(i.e., labels and greebles matched in half of the trials). Differ-
ences between prosopagnosics and controls were evaluated for
statistical significance using Crawford’s modified t test for single
case studies (28).
Controls’ Accuracy. Paired samples t tests showed that Florence’s
control group did better with faces than greebles at both naming
(78.0% vs. 70.3%; P = 0.045) and verification (91.5% vs. 87.2%;
P = 0.002). No significant differences in performance with faces
or greebles were found with Herschel’s control group at either
naming (88.5% and 87.8%, respectively; P = 0.784) or verification
(96.9% and 95.8%, respectively; P = 0.115). The fact that older
controls’ performance with greebles approached that with faces
might be a result of the different training order (older controls
completed the greeble training last). Note that the increased
greeble performance of the older controls raises the threshold
for Herschel to be considered normal at greeble learning.
Fig. 1. Individual scores during the greeble and face training procedures (criterion sessions are shaded). Herschel and Florence were severely impaired at
learning faces but showed normal learning of greebles. The naming scores were scaled to reflect the varying difficulty of each session, corresponding to the
total number of individuals learned up to that point (participants were tested on five individuals in session 1, 10 in session 2, 15 in session 3, and 20 thereafter).
The naming conventions for controls reflect sex (M/F) and age. Each prosopagnosic was compared with his/her age-matched control group. Because of technical
problems, F53‘s results for session 1 faces and session 2 greebles were not recorded. For illustration purposes, values for the missing sessions were assumed to be
the same as the results for the previous session (faces session 1) or the average of the previous and next sessions (greebles session 2).
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Prosopagnosic Accuracy. As expected, Florence and Herschel had
severe difficulties learning faces (Fig. 1). Florence responded
correctly on only 41% of the naming trials and 58% of the ver-
ification trials. Herschel scored 30% for naming and 68% for
verification. All scores were substantially lower than their re-
spective controls’ average scores (Table 1).
In contrast to their performance with faces, both Florence and
Herschel showed greeble learning curves comparable to those of
controls (Fig. 1). Florence’s average performance in the criterion
phase, after all 20 greebles and their families were learned, was
88% for naming, 97% for verification individual, and 97% for
verification family. Herschel’s average scores were 75%, 91%,
and 97%, respectively. These scores were not significantly dif-
ferent from controls (Table 1).
The dissociation between the impaired face learning and the
normal greeble learning for Florence and Herschel was further
confirmed by the Bayesian Standardized Difference Test (29),
which estimates the percentage of the control population exhib-
iting a more extreme difference between two tasks than a patient.
For naming and verification, for both Florence and Herschel,
these estimates were below 0.01%.
Response Times. To check whether their normal accuracy with
greebles could be explained by speed–accuracy tradeoffs, we
compared Florence and Herschel’s response times (RTs) with
controls’ RTs. For each participant, session, and trial type (in-
dividual naming, individual verification, and family verification),
we computed a mean RT for “hit” trials (23). Means were
computed after excluding trials with RTs more than two SDs
from the mean to remove outliers and prevent statistical equiv-
alence resulting from high variability (between 3% and 8% of
trials were excluded per participant). For the criterion phase
(sessions 5–8), Herschel’s average RTs were comparable with
those of controls in all conditions. Florence was slower than
controls in the greeble naming trials but was normal in both types
of verification trials (see Table 1 for RT data and statistical results).
Note that naming RTs are generally slower than verification RTs
and have limited informational value because participants need to
find one key among 21 alternatives, and therefore they reflect more
than perceptual differences between participants.
In the face-learning task, Florence and Herschel were signif-
icantly slower than controls for both verification and naming
trials (Table 1). Furthermore, the differences between RTs in
face trials and RTs in greeble trials were significantly larger
for Florence and Herschel than for controls on both naming
and verification (all P < 0.001, using the Bayesian Standardized
Difference Test) (29).
Expertise Criterion. According to advocates of the expertise hy-
pothesis (2), participants undergoing greeble training should be
considered greeble experts when average RTs for hit trials at
individual-level recognition become comparable (i.e., not statis-
tically different) to average RTs for hit trials at family-level
recognition. Although we discuss our strong reservations about
the value of this criterion or variations on it in the discussion (see
also ref. 30), both prosopagnosics met this criterion. Herschel
reached it in sessions 6, 7, and 8 (P = 0.748, P = 0.946, and P =
0.469), whereas Florence reached the criterion in the final ses-
sion (P = 0.113; Fig. 2). As an additional criterion for expertise,
Gauthier and colleagues recently (23) recommended adding the
constraint that the difference between individual- and family-
level response times should be lower than 95 ms (corresponding
to a 95% interval of response times differences from a previous
greeble study). Herschel’s RTs satisfied this criterion in sessions
6 and 7 (54 ms and −16 ms, respectively). Florence did not meet
this criterion; however, we note that three young controls and
four older controls did not meet this criterion either.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate a marked dissociation between greeble
learning and face learning. It has been suggested that Greeble
recognition after training engages the same mechanisms used for
face processing (2, 15, 21), which predicts lesions disrupting face
recognition will also disrupt greeble recognition after training.
However, two acquired prosopagnosics showed normal perfor-
mance in a standard greeble training procedure while exhibiting
severe impairments with a comparable face task. Both Herschel
and Florence also showed response time effects that are putative
markers of greeble expertise.† Herschel was as fast as controls
and fulfilled both expertise criteria. Florence was as fast as
controls on greeble verification trials, although she was slightly
slower on naming trials (but still significantly faster than on face
naming trials) and did not achieve the more stringent expertise
criterion. However, Florence’s accuracy for both naming and
verification was better than the control average. Her successful
learning of greebles is interesting considering she shows deficits
with learning exemplars from other object classes (Table S1),
raising the possibility that different mechanisms are used to
process different nonface object classes at the within-category
level. If distinct mechanisms are engaged by nonexpert object
classes, expertise acquired with one class (i.e., greebles) may not
be informative about expertise acquired with other classes (e.g.,
faces, cars).
Implications for the Specificity of the Mechanisms Used for Face
Recognition. Substantial evidence suggests faces are processed
by mechanisms that are not involved in the recognition of most
other objects (19, 30–35), but whether these mechanisms are
Table 1. Average accuracy and response times in the criterion phase (last four sessions)










Stimuli Task M (SD) Score P M (SD) Score P M (SD) Score P M (SD) Score P
Faces
Naming 78.0 (7.8) 41.3 0.007 88.5 (9.1) 29.6 0.002 1747 (121) 4441 <0.001 2307 (699) 6560 0.002
Verification 91.5 (3.1) 58.3 <0.001 96.9 (2.7) 68.3 <0.001 938 (61) 2534 <0.001 1491 (381) 2978 0.015
Naming 70.3 (10.9) 87.9 0.195 87.8 (6.0) 75.4 0.114 1619 (158) 2128 0.030 2074 (607) 3428 0.094
Greebles Verification 87.2 (3.6) 97.1 0.052 95.8 (2.1) 90.8 0.079 1017 (194) 1241 0.334 1480 (527) 1882 0.512
Verification
family
90.7 (7.3) 96.7 0.481 95.3 (7.9) 96.7 0.876 814 (153) 890 0.663 1288 (801) 1690 0.661
P values were calculated using Crawford’s t test for single case studies (28). Significant differences are in bold.
†Although it has been suggested that the response time comparison in the verification
trials is the critical measure of expertise, we have empirical and theoretical concerns
about it. In one of the first papers involving greebles (13), of 12 subjects, two met the
expertise criterion in the fourth session, two in the third session, one in the second
session, and one in the first session. In another influential paper (26), of the five controls,
two met the expertise criterion in the first session and another two in the second session.
Thus, many subjects achieve the criterion after very little training. In addition, regardless
of the object classes used, response time with the two types of verification will depend
on the amount of practice with each type and on the similarity between individuals and
between families. Thus, because this criterion is strongly influenced by the parameters of
the experiment, it is a questionable measure of a qualitative shift in recognition processes.
























face-specific or operate on other object classes as well remains
a matter of debate. One influential alternative to the face-
specific account is that these mechanisms contribute to in-
dividuation of objects with which observers have become experts
(1). The greeble training program was designed to study the
acquisition of expertise in the laboratory (2, 23, 26). Although
several reviews have disputed the interpretation of the behav-
ioral and neural results by the expertise advocates (6, 36-38; see
also Implications for the Expertise Hypothesis and for the Greeble
Training Program), greeble training is said to cause a shift in how
participants process greebles. Participants putatively shift from
a feature-based approach to a more holistic process, similar to
the holistic processes applied to upright faces (33, 34), which in
turn leads to face-like perceptual effects (2, 14). Also consistent
with this expertise view, training has been reported to lead to
increased activation to greebles alone (15) and to a reduced
response to faces presented simultaneously with greebles (21) in
face-linked neural markers. However, our findings challenge the
main claim of the expertise hypothesis. Together, Herschel’s and
Florence’s results indicate that intact face mechanisms are not
required for building greeble expertise and bolster the evidence
supporting the face-specific account.
Herschel’s normal performance with greebles is also theoret-
ically interesting, given claims that the fusiform face area (FFA)
is the locus of mechanisms mediating general visual expertise (9,
10, 15; but see refs. 17–18). Although Herschel still shows a right
and a left FFA, these areas exhibit reduced face-selectivity rel-
ative to healthy controls, and his right FFA size is severely re-
duced (39). Previous discussions of the role of FFA for expertise
would predict that this would interfere with the acquisition of
greeble expertise. Contrary to this prediction, Herschel’s normal
greeble learning suggests greeble expertise is not dependent on
a typically functioning FFA. It is possible that reduced func-
tioning of the right FFA may suffice for greeble learning, but
several previous studies failed to find a correlation between ac-
tivation in the FFA and expertise level with novel objects (17, 18,
40, 41) or real objects (12), suggesting that acquisition of ex-
pertise does not depend on the FFA. In two of these studies (18,
41), changes associated with the acquisition of expertise occurred
in the lateral occipital complex, a region implicated in object
processing that appears to be normal in Herschel (39).
We believe the previous findings linking expert greeble pro-
cessing to neural areas implicated in face processing can be
explained by other factors. Thus, in one study (15) the selected
region of interest most likely extended beyond standardly de-
fined FFA into adjacent areas involved in object processing, and
these object areas have been found to be more strongly activated
by objects of expertise (18, 41). In another study (16), the reported
face-like delayed and enhanced N170 to inverted greebles in
greeble experts was much smaller than for faces and left-later-
alized (in contrast with face effects that occurred in both hemi-
spheres). A second study from the same group (21) reported a
selective decrease in the N170 signal to faces when processed
concurrently with greebles in greeble experts. However, a gen-
eral problem with event-related potentials recorded on the
human scalp is source localization, which makes it difficult to
determine whether the reported effects involve face-selective
regions or other regions.
Implications for the Expertise Hypothesis and for the Greeble Training
Program. In interpreting our results, it is important to distinguish
between two separate claims made by advocates of the greeble
framework. First is a “methods claim,” arguing that greeble
training can lead to expertise with a novel object class. Second is
an “expertise claim,” suggesting that expertise with a novel object
class depends on the same processes as expertise with faces. The
dissociations we find indicate that at least one of these hypoth-
eses must be false.
If the methods claim is true, our results imply that greeble
expertise and face expertise rely on separate mechanisms; that is,
the expertise claim is false. If the expertise claim is true, that is, the
same mechanisms mediate object and face expertise, the methods
claim must be false because our results show that the presumed
common expertise mechanisms (damaged in our prosopagnosics)
are not needed for successful completion of the greeble training.
In the case that the methods claim is false (i.e., the greeble
method is not a suitable probe of object expertise at a level that
parallels face expertise), our findings leave open the possibility
that category-general expertise mechanisms are important for
the recognition of both faces and real-world objects of expertise.
One potentially important point of difference between expertise
generated in the laboratory and real-world expertise is the time
scale of acquisition. The 5–10 h of practice with greebles is quite
different from the amount of experience that has been suggested
to lead to real-world expertise (1, 42), and this limited practice
may explain why, despite many studies, very few results suggest
training leads greebles to be processed in a face-like manner (see
ref. 43 for experiments with another novel stimulus class).
The evidence that extensive real-world experience with par-
ticular object classes leads to face-like object recognition is
stronger, but is also weak (see refs. 6 and 36 for reviews). The
finding that dog show judges show face-sized inversion effects
provided important impetus for the expertise view, but an
attempted replication and extension of it failed to find any be-
havioral effects suggesting dog experts process dogs in a face-like
manner (7). Experts with a number of other stimulus classes
(cars, biological cells) have also not shown behavioral indicators
of face-like processing (8). Neural evidence also provides mixed
support. Rossion and colleagues replicated the N170 inter-
ference effect initially found for greebles (21) in a subsequent
study with car experts (44). Furthermore, Gauthier and col-
leagues reported increased activation to cars and birds in the
Fig. 2. Response times during the greeble training procedure (criterion ses-
sions are shaded). Herschel and Florence’s displayed comparable RTs to their
age-matched control groups, indicating that normal greeble learning cannot
be explained by speed–accuracy tradeoffs. In addition, in three (Herschel) and
one (Florence) of the final four sessions, there were no significant differences
between individual and family verification RTs. According to Gauthier and Tarr
(2), the absence of a difference indicates that Herschel and Florence were
greeble experts. The green ticks mark sessions where the absolute difference
between individual and family level hit trials was below 95 ms, the most
stringent expertise criterion (23). Herschel achieved this criterion twice,
whereas Florence did not reach it. Three young controls and four old controls
did not meet this criterion either. ns, difference not significant.
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right FFA in line with behavioral expertise (9), and the effect was
replicated by Xu (11); however, the effects were also present
outside face-selective areas in both studies, raising the possibility
that the increase resulted from enhanced attention to objects of
expertise. More recently, a correlation of FFA activation with
behavioral expertise was shown for cars in a high-resolution
functional MRI study (10). However, there is also considerable
neural evidence against a common mechanism for faces and
other real-world objects of expertise. A recent study investigating
the effects of long-term expertise on gray matter structure found
significant and selective changes restricted to the prefrontal
cortex (45). Results from neuropsychological studies suggest face
processing may dissociate from long-term object expertise. After
brain lesions causing prosopagnosia, WJ acquired a flock of
sheep and became capable of recognizing sheep faces better than
normal controls and scored best among a group of sheep farmers
(46), whereas RM retained his superior ability to recognize car
makes and models (47). Florence and another acquired proso-
pagnosic could successfully discriminate bodies, a category that
generates substantial inversion effects and is relatively well-
matched to faces in terms of visual exposure and perceptual
experience (48). Conversely, several brain-damaged individuals
lost the ability to recognize classes of nonface objects that they
had an intense interest in, but their face recognition remained
normal (e.g., CK in ref. 49; MX in ref. 50).
Our results are also inconsistent with a criticism of greeble
studies. It has been suggested that the greeble part configuration
(two features above one feature above another feature) is so
similar to the face configuration that face perception mechanisms
are activated by them (27, 37). This activation of the face system
then causes greeble processing to show the cognitive and neural
hallmarks seen for face processing. Normal greeble performance
in the two acquired prosopagnosics, however, indicates that their
visual systems did not treat the greebles as faces. This finding
complements results from CK, an object agnosic who can recognize
faces; CK was severely impaired with greebles despite his intact
face recognition (51). Herschel, Florence, and CK’s dissociation,
however, does not rule out the possibility that some participants
treat the greebles as faces because of their similarity (27).
Conclusion
Our study shows normal greeble learning by two acquired pro-
sopagnosics, providing straightforward evidence that face and
greeble recognition rely on different mechanisms. This finding is
consistent with the view that faces are processed by mechanisms
specialized for faces rather than objects of expertise. Although
the current study does not directly address the possibility that
real objects of expertise and faces depend on common expertise
mechanisms, it compellingly demonstrates that the mechanisms
used for face processing are not necessary for normal performance
in greeble training, and it undermines interpretations of previous
greeble-based results used to support the expertise hypothesis.
Materials and Methods
Prosopagnosic Participants. Herschel is a right-handed British male with
a degree in astronomy who runs a research laboratory. He was 55 y old at the
time of testing (born 1956). In 2008, after two strokes that lesioned his
occipitotemporal cortex (primarily in the right hemisphere) and right hip-
pocampus (Fig. S1), he lost the upper left visual field and a large part of his
upper right visual field and became severely prosopagnosic. All core face
areas (the FFA, occipital face area, and face area in posterior superior
temporal sulcus) were found bilaterally (except left occipital face area, which
could not be identified), using a contrast of dynamic faces greater than
dynamic objects (52). These face-selective areas, however, showed lower
percentage signal changes to faces in Herschel than in controls (39). In ad-
dition, Herschel’s right FFA consisted of only nine voxels, whereas controls
averaged 69.3 voxels and ranged from 32 to 117 voxels (statistical threshold,
P = 10−4 uncorrected). Herschel’s activation to objects in the lateral occipital
cortex bilaterally was normal (see ref. 39 for functional MRI details and
neuropsychological assessment).
Florence is a right-handed female nurse from Canada who was 29 y old at
the time of testing (born 1982). Shewas described in previous studies as R-AT1
(53–54). In 2006, she became prosopagnosic after a resection of her right
amygdala and right hippocampus to control epilepsy. Neuropsychological
assessment and functional MRI were conducted in 2007 (see ref. 54 for details).
Florence performed normally on a battery of cognitive and low-level visual
tests. Despite her face impairments, a static face localizer (activation to faces
minus activation to objects) revealed face activation bilaterally in all core
face-selective areas: FFA, occipital face area, and face area in posterior
superior temporal sulcus. In 2008, she underwent a second operation that
removed most of her right anterior temporal lobe, sparing the areas
previously found to be face-selective (Fig. S1). Florence has noted no visual
changes since her second surgery, and her normal performance on tasks
described here suggests her early visual processes were unaffected by the
second procedure.
Test results confirming Florence and Herschel’s prosopagnosia are sum-
marized in Table S1. In addition to deficits in face perception and face
memory, Florence shows mixed performance with within-class object
matching and recognition. Herschel’s impairments with within-class dis-
crimination, however, are restricted to faces. In addition, in a previous paper
(39), we reported his normal performance with basic-level recognition of
objects presented for 50 ms (with the exception of mammals). He had dif-
ficulties recognizing severely degraded objects and words in visual closure
tests, but the origin of this deficit may involve mechanisms such as object
segmentation that are not taxed by the greeble and face tasks.
Control Participants. Two control groups consisted of six participants each.
The first group was age-matched to Florence (mean age, 29.3 y; age range,
27–32 y; five women), and the second group was age-matched to Herschel
(mean age, 52.3 y; age range, 47–56 y; four women).
Stimuli. Greeble stimuli were selected from those used in the original study
(2). Similar to faces, greebles have a common first-order configuration (Fig.
3). They can be identified at the family level on the basis of their overall
shape and at the individual level on the basis of the sizes and shapes of their
parts. The face stimuli (Fig. 3) were selected from a large set of computer-
generated male faces produced by Facegen (Singular Inversions), according
to a pixel-based similarity matrix (i.e., highly similar faces were preferred).
Procedure. The greeble training procedure closely followed procedures used
in previous studies (23, 25, 26). We asked participants to complete eight
training sessions, one per day, on consecutive days (one control participant
had a 1-d break between two sessions), with the goal of learning to identify
greebles at the individual and family level. Consistent with previous termi-
nology (23), the training included a “learning phase” (first four sessions) and
a “criterion phase” (last four sessions). The five greeble families were in-
troduced in the first session and probed for learning/recognition throughout
the procedure (six exemplars per family). Twenty greebles identified at the
individual level (four from each family) were introduced gradually during
the learning phase (five new greebles per session). Families had four-letter
names each starting with a different vowel, and individual greebles had
four-letter names each starting with a different consonant. Participants
learned the greebles in several different types of trials. In inspect trials,
Fig. 3. Ten of the 20 greebles and faces learned
during the experiments. Individual greebles belong
to one of five families (in parentheses) and could be
identified at the individual level and at the family
level. Faces were identified only at the individual
level. Faces and greebles had abstract four-letter
names starting with a consonant (family names
started with a vowel).
























participants viewed greebles and their corresponding family or individual
name one at a time. In naming with feedback trials, participants were asked
to identify individual greebles by pressing the key corresponding to the first
letter of their name; after each trial, the correct name of the greeble was
presented. In naming trials, participants were asked to identify greebles at
the individual or family level but were not given the correct response. In
verification trials, participants were presented with a name, which could be
an individual or a family name, followed by a greeble, and asked to indicate
whether the name and the greeble matched. The naming and verification
trials included auditory feedback (a beep) for incorrect answers. During the
criterion phase, participants were tested with the naming and verification
trials for successful learning of 30 greebles at the family level and 20 greebles
at the individual level. Learning sessions lasted about 60min, whereas criterion
sessions lasted about 15 min.
A similar training procedure was created with computer-generated faces
instead of greebles, with the difference that faces were not grouped into
families (thus there were no family trials). Note that although participants
had extensive exposure to faces and none to greebles before the experiment,
all individual stimuli (faces and greebles) were unfamiliar, and pilot testing
and control data presented in the results section indicated that the difficulty
of the face training procedure was comparable to that of the greeble pro-
cedure. Sessions 1–4 lasted ∼45 min, whereas sessions 5–8 lasted about
12 min.
All participants underwent both training procedures (greebles and faces),
with a break of at least 4 wk in between. Florence, Herschel, and Florence’s
control group completed the greeble training first, and Herschel’s control
group completed the face training first.
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